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   Introduction 
 
Whereas most of the currency crisis in the 1980s, especially in Latin 
America, had no direct link with a banking crisis1, the recent Asian 
currency crisis broke out concomitant with a banking crisis. This is 
because in the 1970s and early 1980s, financial markets were highly regu-
lated and most of the foreign debt was of the public sector. On the other 
hand, most of the Asian countries in 1990s were in the process of financial 
and capital account liberalization, and the foreign debt was heavily 
concentrated in the private sector. 
   Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) argues that the causal link between 
the currency crisis and the banking crisis is not unidirectional. In a sample 
of 20 countries, with 26 banking crisis and 76 BOP crisis altogether, 
they found that the probability of a BOP crisis conditional on the banking 
crisis was 0.46, much higher than unconditional probability of BOP crisis, 
which was 0.29. The probability of banking crisis reaching a peak 
conditional on BOP crisis was 0.16, whereas the unconditional probability 
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of banking crisis was 10%, suggesting that existing problems in the 
banking sector were aggravated or new ones were created by the currency 
crisis.  
   Although it took place in 1994, the Mexican currency crisis shares 
similar characteristic  with those in the 1980s in that the problem was 
the debt of the public sector. The difference of the Mexican case with 
that of Asian countries including Korea, was that the Mexican currency 
crises preceded the banking crisis, whereas the currency crisis in Asian 
countries was, in a sense, caused by the banking crisis.  
   The common feature of Mexico and Korea was that both countries 
were in the process of financial and capital account liberalization. There-
fore, it could be suggested that, although the currency crisis is closely 
related with capital account liberalization, the latter does not determine 
the causality between banking crisis and currency crisis.  
   However, if we analyze the way the capital account was liberalized, 
we can find that there is a close relationship between capital account 
liberalization and the sequence of the banking and currency crisis. In 
Mexico, the capital account was liberalized largely by allowing foreign 
investment in the stock market and government bonds, with the borrowing 
of commercial banks restricted. In Korea, the capital market was opened 
by allowing financial institutions and firms to borrow from abroad and 
to issue bonds in the international capital market.  
   The objective of the paper is to show that the difference in the process 
by which the capital account was liberalized can partly explain why, in 
Mexico, the banking crisis deepened only after the currency crisis had 
broken out, and why, in Asian countries, the currency crisis was caused 
by the financial crisis.  
   This paper is organized in the following way: in section 2, we briefly 
explain the crisis in Korea and Mexico with some focus on the financial 
sector; in section 3, we analyze the interaction between the banking crisis 
and currency crisis; in section 4, we explain why the process by which 
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the capital market was opened in Korea and Mexico played an important 
role in this interaction; we conclude in section 5.  
 
   Crisis in Korea and Mexico 
 
   Korea 
 
Among the many compounded causes behind Korea's foreign exchange 
crisis, the most fundamental reason is the aggravation of the financial 
structure of firms that had cumulated after 1995 together with the 
downturn of the economy which resulted in large-scale bankruptcies. This 
has been reflected in the enlargement of bad loans of the financial sector 
which, combined with the repercussions of the foreign exchange crisis 
in Thailand and other East Asian economies, detonated the foreign 
exchange crisis in Korea.  
   The development of the Korean economy until the 1980s was achieved 
through a tacit agreement among the government, conglomerates and 
banks, and as result, there has been a huge moral hazard problem. Also 
the competition among "chaebols" resulted in excessive investment. This 
economic  atmosphere changed to an extent in the 1990s by liberalizing 
the financial sector and also by deregulating the economy, but there has 
been no drastic  change in the incentive structure and the business practice 
of the economy. 
   However, as the Korean government carried out a relatively conser-
vative fiscal and monetary policy, the market opening and financial 
liberalization did not disturb much of the economic stability. As seen 
on [Table 1], the Korean economy could maintain a high GDP growth 
rate and low inflation rate up to 1996. The current account deficit was 
the only visible problem reaching 4.9% of the GDP in 1996. Even though 
there has been a current account deficit throughout the years except in 
1993, the foreign reserve increased due to the large inflow of short-term 
foreign capital. 
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Table 1, Korea's Macroeconomic Indicators  
(Unit: %, billion dollars) 
Source: Cho and Kim (1998) 
Note: 1)IMF consolidated fiscal deficit 
 
   The current account deficit and the inflow of short-term capital 
reflected the increase in the investment of the firms that were supplied 
with large short-term capital. The sudden increase in the investment by 
the "cheabols" was made possible by the capital liberalization and 
stimulated by the implicit traditional guarantee of the government. The 
lack of a proper incentive structure and the inadequate prudential 
regulation and supervision could not effectively restrict the non-profitable 
investment of the large conglomerates.  
   In the financial sector, by changing the short-term financing companies 
to merchant banks and allowing these banks to carry out foreign exchange 
transactions, the inflow of short-term capital increased substantially. Being 
allowed to borrow from abroad, the merchant banks usually borrowed 
capital on a short-term basis but invested it on a long-term basis. Out 
of the total capital brought in by the merchant banks during 1992 to 1996 
on short-term basis, those invested on a short-term basis were merely 
 
Growth 
Rate Inflation 
Corporate  
bond yield 
Fiscal 
deficit1) 
/GDP 
Current 
account 
/GDP 
Foreign  
reserves 
80-85 
86-91 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
6.3 
9.9 
5.1 
5.8 
8.6 
8.9 
7.1 
10.9 
6.1 
6.3 
4.8 
6.2 
4.5 
4.9 
19.0 
15.1 
16.2 
12.6 
12.9 
13.8 
11.9 
-2.5 
-0.2 
-0.7 
0.3 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
-3.8 
 3.0 
-1.5 
 0.1 
-1.2 
-2.0 
-4.9 
7.1 
12.2 
17.1 
20.3 
25.7 
32.7 
33.2 
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3~ 6% and the rest were invested on a long-term basis. Although this 
term-mismatch made the economy vulnerable to external shocks and prone 
to a foreign exchange crisis, the supervisory authorities did not regulate 
it adequately. 
   Against this backdrop, as many conglomerates went bankrupt since 
early 1997, and the government failed to enforced a corporate and 
financial sector reform policy in appropriate time due to the burden of 
the coming presidential election, international confidence in the Korean 
government dropped rapidly. 
   The foreign exchange crisis in Thailand that erupted contemporaneous 
with the increased vulnerability of the Korean financial sector, raised seri-
ous doubts about Korea's macroeconomic situation, soundness of the 
financial sector, political situation and the government's willingness to 
carry out reforms, and even doubts on further economic development of 
the Asian countries including Korea. This led to the sudden flight of the 
foreign investors from the East Asian countries. 
 
   Mexico 
 
After a long period of economic  stagnation since the debt crisis in 1982, 
Mexico undertook a series of structural reform policies including trade 
liberalization, stabilization, deregulation, and privatization in the late 
1980s. Financial liberalization was an important component of the 
structural reform. Interest rates were liberalized and commercial banks 
that had been nationalized in 1982, were reprivatized between 1991 and 
1992. The success in the negotiation and the subsequent restructuring of 
foreign debt allowed Mexico to return to the international financial market, 
and after the opening of the capital market in 1990, there has been a 
steady inflow of foreign capital of over $20 billion annually since 1991.  
   Used as an instrument of stabilization, the exchange rate was pegged 
to the dollar in 1988, and since January 1989 it was adjusted upward 
every day at a specified rate. Since November 1991, the exchange rate 
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was allowed to fluctuate within an exchange rate band which was slightly 
expanded everyday. The short-term confidence of the exchange rate band 
brought about foreign capital in search of interest rate differentials, and 
in turn the short-term capital inflow allowed this policy to be maintained. 
Also the expectation from NAFTA induced a constant inflow of foreign 
direct investments. Capital inflow and the financial liberalization enabled 
reprivatized banks to drastically increase lending to private sector, leading 
sometimes to suboptimal credit standards with poor collateral, and rising 
exposure to risk.  
   The problem of the capital inflow was that it was mostly for portfolio 
investment, and so the inflow of foreign capital made the Mexican 
economy very vulnerable to reverses of the flow resulting from internal 
or external shocks. The overvalued exchange rate and the excessive 
current account deficit of over $20 billion annually could be sustained 
only with a continuous inflow of foreign capital.  
   In order to prevent the expansion of the money supply caused by 
the inflows of foreign capital, a sterilization policy was enforced and 
accordingly the inflation rate dropped to a single digit for the first time 
in 20 years. But as a result, the real interest rate increased and the economy 
went into a depression. As seen in [Table 2], the GDP growth in 1993 
was 0.7% and, in 1994, it increased slightly to 3.5%.  
 
Table 2, Mexico's Macroeconomic Indicators  
        (Unit: %, billion dollars) 
 
Growth 
rate 
Inflation 
Fiscal 
balance 
/GDP 
Current 
account  
deficit 
Foreign  
portfolio 
investment 
Foreign  
direct  
investment 
Interest  
rate 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
4.5 
3.6 
2.8 
0.7 
3.5 
29.9 
18.8 
11.9 
8.0 
7.0 
-3.3 
-1.5 
0.5 
-2.1 
-3.9 
7.6 
14.9 
24.8 
23.4 
28.9 
6.0 
23.0 
25.6 
29.4 
9.9 
2.6 
4.8 
4.4 
4.4 
8.0 
37.07 
22.56 
18.78 
18.56 
15.50 
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Source: Mexico's Central Bank 
 
   In March of 1994 however, foreign investment drop drastically as 
result of political instability caused by the assassination of the presidential 
candidate of the ruling party and the increase in U.S. interest rates. The 
exchange rate faced upward pressure, and it depreciated close to the 
upperbound of the exchange rate band. Mexico's Central Bank had to 
inject $10 billion from the international reserve to defend this band. To 
prevent the outflow of foreign capital, the interest rate of government 
peso-denominated bonds (Cetes) was increased from 9% to 18%, and the 
issuance of Tesobonos, a short-tern dollar-indexed bonds, was increased 
by a large quantity. But nevertheless, because of the devaluation risk, 
a large amount of capital moved from Cetes to Tesobonos, and also out 
of the country. Some observers argue that even higher interest rates might 
have helped, but a recession was an unacceptable alternative on the eve 
of a presidential election. Furthermore, there was the concern that higher 
interest would negatively impact the banking system which had already 
been weakened by a growing volume of past-due loans.  
   But political instability continued. In June the minister of internal 
affairs much trusted by the people resigned and, in October, the leader 
of the ruling party was assassinated. Going though many stages of 
defending the exchange rate, the central bank spent most of its foreign 
reserves, and the Mexican government had to devalue the exchange rate 
by 15% on December 20th, 20 days after the government took office.  
   For the banking sector that had already accumulated a sizable amount 
of bad loans, it was difficult to withstand the impact of the currency 
crisis. Interest rates were increased even more to stabilize the exchange 
rate, and the economic activity dropped drastically. With high interest 
rates and economic recession, past-due loans increased dramatically, 
causing a banking crisis and leading the Mexican government to launch 
a support program for the financial sector.  
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   Banking Crisis and Currency Crisis 
 
Although financial fragility was frequently mentioned as an element of 
the Mexican currency crisis, it was hardly considered as the main cause2. 
Most of the studies point to the overvaluation of the real exchange rate 
and the large current account deficit financed by short-term capital inflows 
as the main causes of the Mexican currency crisis3. Other contends that 
the large imbalance between stocks of liquid financial assets and gross 
reserves was the most critical cause4.  
   Moreover, Sachs et. al.(1996) contended that "devaluation and 
financial panic were separate - logically and temporally - with devaluation 
coming first, and then helping to provoke the financial panic." They 
argued that the financial panic came as a consequence of the devaluation 
because investors interpreted the devaluation as a signal that the Mexican 
government might repudiate on its dollar-denominated liabilities, as it 
effectively had done in 1982 when it froze dollar-denominated bank 
accounts and paid them back at a controlled exchange rate significantly 
below the market rate. 
   We support this view. We consider that the crisis proceeded from 
the foreign exchange market to the banking sector, and not the other way. 
Panic on government securities quickly led to a generalized panic in the 
Mexican economy, especially the financial sector. Commercial banks were 
suddenly subject to possibilities of a run with respect to their dol-
lar-denominated deposits that amounted to $39 billion as of October 1994. 
Corporations also found themselves in a difficult situation to roll over 
their short-term external debts.  
   Fortunately, the foreign borrowing of the commercial banks were not 
                                                                 
2) One exception is Gil-Díaz (1998) 
3) See Edwards (1995), for example 
4) See Calvo and Mendoza (1996) 
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as large as in Korea, because it was restricted by the Central Bank. 
Although it is true that the increased foreign borrowing enabled commer-
cial banks to increase credit to the private non-banking sector, banks' 
foreign borrowing was not the main factor that drove up bank credits. 
In fact, as can be seen in the [Figure 1], liabilities in foreign currency 
increased in a lower rate than those in domestic currency. In 1987, the 
share of the bank liabilities in foreign currency was more than 50%, 
whereas in 1994, just before the currency crisis, this figure had declined 
to about 30%.  
   Nevertheless, Mexican commercial banks had to suffer from the 
indirect effects of the currency crisis. Aside from the instantaneous 
increase in the value of dollar debt in terms of peso, the financial 
soundness of the commercial banks continuously deteriorated because of 
the high interest rates and drop in economic activity. Past-due loans 
increased from 8.7% in December 1994 to 17.1% in November 1995. 
 
   Figure 1, Liabilities of the financial sector: Mexico 
   Contrary to the Mexican case, in Korea, the banking crisis is 
considered by most observers to have been the main cause of the currency 
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crisis. In Korea, financial institutions and firms were heavily indebted 
to foreign banks before the crisis. In this situation, capital withdrawal 
by foreign investors would directly affect the financial soundness of the 
financial institutions and firms, and at the same time exhaust foreign 
reserves, leading to a foreign exchange crisis. The reasons that provoked 
the withdrawal of foreign investment were the aggravation of the financial 
structure of firms due to the downturn of the economy, and large-scale 
bankruptcies. Of course, if the banking sector were sound, a simple 
downturn of the economy would not result in a banking or currency crisis. 
But when an economy is in the process of financial liberalization, as Korea 
was before the crisis, the financial fragility tends to increase, and with 
it the probability of a banking crisis5. This is because financial liberaliza-
tion, by giving banks and other financial intermediaries more freedom 
of action, increases the opportunities to take on risk.  
   In Korea, commercial banks had increased the foreign borrowing and 
with it lending to the private sector without proper assessment of the 
risks involved. This would not have been a problem in an economic boom, 
but in an economic recession, it resulted in an increase of bad loans. 
The resulting enlargement of the bad loans of the financial sector caused 
a run of foreign creditors against Korean banks causing a currency crisis 
and further aggravating the banking crisis.  
   The difference in the experience of Korea and Mexico with respect 
to the relationship between the banking crisis and the currency crisis, 
can be partly explained by the way the capital account was liberalized. 
In Korea, the foreign exchange business and foreign borrowing of 
domestic banks were liberalized first, while foreign investment in the 
domestic bond market was restricted. In Mexico, capital account 
liberalization took the form of opening domestic bond and equity market 
to foreign investment while external borrowing of commercial banks was 
restricted. In the first case, capital outflow led to both banking and 
currency crisis, whereas, in the second case, it provoked the currency 
                                                                 
5) See Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
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crisis first, which then, proceeded to a banking crisis.  
 
 
   Capital Market Opening 
 
   Financial Liberalization, Capital Market Opening and Capital Inflow 
 
In Korea, the restrictions on the foreign investment in the domestic stock 
market and short-term trade-related credit were relaxed first, while 
restrictions on foreign investment in domestic fixed income assets such 
as government securities and corporate bonds issued by large firms were 
maintained. Korea liberalized the foreign exchange business and foreign 
borrowing of domestic banks quic kly, while controlling the direct 
borrowing of corporate firms from abroad. This allowed rapid expansion 
of foreign debt channeled through the domestic banking system and to 
a less extent through direct borrowing of corporate firms6.  
 As can be seen in [Table 3], there was an abrupt increase in total external 
debt between 1992 and 1996. The largest increase in external debt was 
experienced by the financial sector, especially if financial institutions' 
offshore borrowing and foreign branches borrowing are included. The 
non-financial private sector also increased foreign borrowing, but not as 
much as the financial sector, while the external debt of the public sector 
decreased continuously. Another aspect was that short-term debt increased 
much more rapidly than long-run debt in both financial and non-financial 
private sector.  
   Foreign investment in the Korean stock market was gradually 
liberalized and there was significant inflow of foreign capital as is shown 
in [Table 4]. However, compared with capital inflow due to external 
borrowing, foreign investment in the stock market was relatively small. 
                                                                 
6) See Cho (1998) 
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Table 3, Korea's External Debt: 1992-1997 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997P 
  Total foreign debt1) 
      (long term) 
      (short term) 
    Public sector 
      (long term) 
      (short term) 
    Private sector 
      (long term) 
      (short term) 
    Financial sector 
      (long term) 
(short term) 
42.8 
24.3 
18.5 
 5.6 
 5.6 
   0 
13.7 
 6.5 
 7.2 
23.5 
12.2 
13.3 
43.9 
24.7 
19.2 
 3.8 
 3.8 
   0 
15.6 
 7.8 
 7.8 
24.4 
13.0 
11.4 
56.8 
26.5 
30.4 
 3.6 
 3.6 
   0 
20.0 
 9.0 
11.0 
33.3 
13.9 
19.4 
78.4 
33.1 
45.3 
 3.0 
 3.0 
   0 
26.1 
10.5 
15.6 
49.3 
19.6 
29.7 
104.7 
 43.7 
 61.0 
  2.4 
  2.4 
    0 
 35.6 
 13.6 
 22.0 
 66.7 
 27.7 
 39.0 
120.8 
 69.6 
 51.2 
 18.0 
 18.0 
    0 
 42.3 
 17.6 
 24.7 
 60.5 
 33.9 
 26.6 
Total foreign obligation2) 
      (long term) 
      (short term) 
    Public sector 
      (long term) 
      (short term) 
    Private sector 
      (long term) 
      (short term) 
    Financial sector 
      (long term) 
      (short term) 
62.9 
26.0 
37.0 
 5.6 
 5.6 
   0 
13.7 
 6.5 
 7.2 
43.6 
13.9 
29.8 
67.0 
26.7 
40.3 
 3.8 
 3.8 
   0 
15.6 
 7.8 
 7.8 
47.5 
15.0 
32.5 
88.7 
 3.3 
58.4 
 3.6 
 3.6 
   0 
20.0 
 9.0 
11.0 
65.1 
17.7 
47.4 
119.7 
 41.0 
 78.7 
  3.0 
  3.0 
   0 
 26.1 
 10.5 
 15.6 
 90.5 
 27.5 
 63.1 
157.5 
 57.5 
100.0 
  2.4 
  2.4 
    0 
 35.6 
 13.6 
 22.0 
119.5 
 41.5 
 78.0 
154.4 
 86.0 
 68.5 
 18.0 
 18.0 
   0 
 42.3 
 17.6 
 24.7 
 94.1 
 50.3 
 43.8 
 
Source: Cho (1998) 
Note: 1) World Bank standard of classification of external debt which includes 
domestic residents debt only.  
2) World Bank standard plus financial institutions' offshore borrowing and foreign 
branches' borrowing.  
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   Table 4, Foreign Investment in Korean Stock Market 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997.1-10 
Accumulated (billion us$) 
(% of GDP) 
Share in transaction (%) 
Shareholding (%) 
2.1 
(0.7) 
1.80 
4.13 
7.7 
(2.3) 
2.42 
8.74 
9.6 
(2.5) 
2.45 
9.22 
12.0 
(2.6) 
4.80 
10.02 
16.5 
(3.4) 
6.02 
11.51 
17.1 
( - ) 
6.32 
10.43 
Ceiling to foreigners (%) 10 10 12 15 20 23 
Source: Bank of Korea (1997) 
 
 
On the other hand, Mexico started financial deregulation as the Salinas 
administration actively pursued market-oriented reform since 1989. 
Interest rates were liberalized, banks were privatized and the capital 
market was opened. Mexican law was changed in 1990, allowing 
foreigners to hold government bonds as Cetes and Tesobonos, and to 
buy (non-voting) shares in almost all sectors of the economy.  
   However, the Bank of Mexico had imposed in 1992 a ceiling7 on 
the amount of foreign currency denominated liabilities that banks could 
take on, considering that the central bank is limited in its ability to act 
as a lender of last resort with respect to banks' external obligations in 
foreign currency. This policy was reflected in the composition of the capi-
tal inflow as can be seen in the [Figure 2]. 
 
                                                                 
7) Regulations limit foreign currency liabilities of commercial banks to 20% of total 
liabilities.  
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    Figure 2, Capital Inflow: Mexico 
 
   The capital inflow to Mexico can be divided into foreign investment, 
loans and deposits. Before the currency crisis, the amount of loans and 
deposits were almost insignificant compared to foreign investment. 
Contrary to the Korean case, neither the financial sector nor the 
non-financial private sector was accumulating such a large amount of 
foreign debt.  
   Foreign investment, on the other hand, came in three main forms. 
The first was foreign direct investment, which is usually long-term 
because it involves commitments that cannot be reversed quickly and at 
low cost. As can be seen in [Figure 3], the trend of foreign direct 
investment in Mexico was relatively stable. Second, capital inflow took 
the form of purchases in the Mexican stock market. A sudden reversal 
of foreign buying would mainly cause a drop in stock market prices 
making it costly to withdraw more money from this market. The third 
form of capital inflow was the purchase of bonds - largely government 
bonds. A large portion of these securities were short-term bonds, often 
maturing in one to three months.  
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   Figure 3, Foreign Investment: Mexico 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Of 
the 
three forms of capital inflow, the last one probably posed the largest 
danger. If anything caused foreign investors to decide to pull out of 
Mexico, investors could simply take their money out of the country as 
their securities matured, putting tremendous pressures on the government's 
reserves within a matter of weeks. Actually, this last component was the 
largest in 1992 and 1993, making Mexican economy very vulnerable to 
internal or external shocks.  
 
   Credit Boom  
 
The extraordinary expansion of bank credit to the private sector in Mexico 
between 1991 and 1993 was due to the liberalization of interest rates 
and the deregulation of the banking system coupled with the favorable 
prospects for the Mexican economy, a reduced demand for funds by the 
public sector and an enormous inflow of capital from abroad.  
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    Figure 4, External Borrowing: Mexico 
   But as can be seen in [Figure 1 & 5], in Mexico, domestic credit 
grew at a higher rate than liabilities in foreign currency including 
borrowing and deposits. The most important factor of the dramatic 
increase in the credit to private sector seems to have been the reduction 
in the demand for funds by the public sector [Figure 5]. 
   The enormous capital inflow was not fully reflected in the increase 
of domestic credit from the banking sector because foreign investment 
was mainly directed towards government bonds. This means that the 
government not only reduced the demand for funds due to a reduced 
fiscal deficit, but also changed the source of funds from residents to 
non-residents. After foreigners were allowed to purchase Mexican 
government bonds in 1990, the foreign residents' share in government 
bond holding continuously increased to almost 70% in 1994. This is the 
reason why the currency crisis originated from the public sector and not 
from the private sector.  
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   Figure 5, Credit Granted by Banking System: Mexico 
   Contrary to the Mexican case, in Korea, credit expansion over the 
last ten years happened rapidly through merchant banks and investment 
trusts, and this contributed towards creating a bubble in the entire 
economy. As can be seen in [Table 5], financial institutions' external debt 
increased at a higher rate than total liabilities. The corporate sector also 
depended heavily on foreign borrowing.  
   The difference in credit expansion between Korea and Mexico was 
that the Korean case is characterized by a drastic  increase of investment 
whereas in Mexico the increased bank loans were mainly for consumption 
purpose. In Mexico, both consumption and investment increased between 
1990 and 1994, but the former increased more rapidly than the latter. 
Consumption and investment were 78% and 17.9% of GDP, respectively 
in 1990. These figures changed to 83.1% and 19.4% in 1994. 
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Table 5, Total liabilities of Korean Financial Institutions 
                                            (Unit: %) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Total liabilities 
External debt 
External/Total 
24 
54 
5.4 
21 
19 
5.3 
18 
28 
5.8 
27 
36 
6.2 
21 
19 
6.1 
19 
44 
7.4 
22 
75 
10.6 
Corp. sec. Overseas 
borrowing/Tot 
4.1 7.1 1.5 6.6 8.4 10.4 6.1 
Source: Cho (1998). 
 
 
   In Korea, the increase in investment, especially in the export sector, 
could have implied a better management of foreign resources if the rate 
of return of those investments had been high enough. However, this was 
not the case. Korea had the lowest return on assets among the nine Asian 
countries between 1988 and 19968. The low return on assets combined 
with the downturn of the economy aggravated the financial structure of 
the corporate firms and led to large scale bankruptcies. This has been 
reflected in the enlargement of the bad loans of the financial sector which 
provoked the run of foreign creditors against Korean financial institutions.  
 
   4.3 Capital Outflow, Banking Crisis and Currency Crisis 
 
Before the crisis, Korean banks, especially merchant banks, had borrowed 
in a short-term basis and invested in a long-term basis. When the 
economic  situation deteriorated and foreign investors tried to withdraw 
their money, these financial institutions had problem in meeting their 
                                                                 
8) The nine Asian countries are: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. See Claessens et. al. (1998) 
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obligations. The Central Bank of Korea had to supply the foreign 
exchange out of international reserves to prevent default. Therefore, the 
international reserves of Korea decreased from $25 billion in June 1998 
to US$8.9 billion at the end of 1997.  
   The lack of international reserves to meet the payment of external 
obligations forced Korea to enter into debt restructuring with international 
banks, and as the obligations were largely of the financial institutions, 
the restructuring was mainly with respect to these institutions' debt. By 
negotiation, Korea could restructure US$21.8 billion of banks' short-term 
debt.9 
   Whereas the currency crisis originated from financial sector in Korea, 
in Mexico, it did not. The direct impact of the December 1994 devaluation 
on Mexico's commercial banks was limited because of the restrictions 
imposed on foreign currency denominated liabilities, as explained before. 
Consequently, the capital outflow from the banking sector during 1994 
and 1995, was relatively small.  
   In 1995, the capital account posted a $15.1 billion surplus, slightly 
above the $14.6 billion surplus in 1994 as can be seen in [Table 6]. 
Nevertheless, the capital account would have reported a $11.1 billion defi-
cit had the resources disbursed from the international financial assistance 
package been excluded. The main factor would have been the amor-
tizations of Tesobonos for $18.4 billion. Net amortizations of foreign debt 
by Mexican commercial banks was just $4.1 billion. The relatively small 
amortization of foreign debt by Mexican commercial banks was without 
any formal renegotiation with international creditors. Although the stock 
market index (IPC) experienced a drastic drop in the first months after 
the devaluation, this was not because of the withdrawal of foreign 
investment. There was no additional investment in the stock market by 
the foreigners, but neither was there any massive withdrawal.  
 
                                                                 
9) See Bank of Korea (1998). 
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Table 6, Capital Account: Mexico 1994-1995 
1995  1994 
I II Annual 
Capital Account 
Excluding Supports 
  Foreign Direct Investment 
  Foreign Portfolio Investment 
    Stock Market 
    Tesobonos 
    Other 
  Loans and Deposits  
    Public Sector 
      Financial Support 
      Other 
    Private Sector 
      Commercial Banks 
      Non-Financial 
  Assets  
    Tesobonos(Mex. Residents)    
    Other 
14.6 
14.6 
11.0 
 8.2 
 4.1 
14.3 
-10.2 
 1.1 
-1.6 
 0.0 
-1.6 
 2.7 
 1.5 
 1.2 
-5.7 
 0.0 
-5.3 
  4.6 
-13.4 
  3.9 
-11.2 
  0.2 
-10.2 
 -1.2 
 13.2 
 15.8 
 18.0 
 -2.2 
 -2.5 
 -4.1 
 1.6 
 -1.4 
 -1.1 
 -0.3 
10.6 
 2.3 
 3.0 
 1.1 
 0.3 
 -6.1 
 6.9 
10.0 
 9.0 
 8.3 
 0.7 
 1.0 
 -0.8 
 1.9 
-3.6 
-1.0 
-2.5 
 15.1 
-11.1 
  7.0 
-10.1 
  0.5 
 -16.3 
   5.7 
  23.2 
  24.8 
  26.3 
  -1.5 
  -1.5 
  -5.0 
  3.4 
  -5.0 
  -2.1 
  -2.9 
 Source: Informe Anual 1995, Banco de México 
 
   Even if the Mexican banking sector did not suffer much from massive 
withdrawals by foreign creditors, it had to suffer from devaluation, higher 
interest rates and a drop in economic activity. But these effects appeared 
in a gradual process. With these damaging effects, banks' capitalization 
ratios continuously deteriorated. 
   As foreign investors withdrew their money from government bonds 
by selling or not rolling over the bonds, the government had to increase 
the interest rate to stabilize the foreign exchange market. This had a nega-
tive effect on the firms, increasing their interest payments. Additionally, 
the higher interest rate depressed even more the economic activity and 
reduced the profit of the firms. The difficulties of the firms, in turn, were 
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reflected in the increase in past-due loans and in the weakness of the 
banking sector, leading to a banking crisis.  
 
 
   Prudential Regulation and Supervision 
 
Inadequate prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions 
were common feature of Korea and Mexico. It is well known that in 
the process of financial liberalization, the lack of adequate prudential 
regulation and supervision can lead the financial institutions to take too 
much risk, and make the financial sector vulnerable to financial crisis. 
In both countries, the institutional reform was slow and inadequate 
compared to the fast financial liberalization and capital market opening, 
leading to the deepened distortion and also to larger exposure to external 
shocks.  
   In the case of Korea, before the foreign exchange crisis, the risk shar-
ing relationship among the government, conglomerates, and banks 
increased the moral hazard, and the loose financial supervision structure 
and the lack of market capacity to supervise and monitor the investment 
behavior, aggravated the structural problems. But there was also a safety 
net to share the risk and to socialize the loss through the bail-out program 
of the government. It was possible, to an extent, to stymie the excessive 
investment of firms through the entry barrier by the industrial policy of 
the government. However, financial liberalization, capital market opening 
and other deregulations brought about the collapse of the existing safety 
net before a new mechanism was built that could restrain the moral hazard 
and the excessive investment.  
   Moreover, even with a careful approach to liberalizing the capital 
market and continued regulation of foreign investment in the bond market, 
the foreign debt structure became more concentrated in short-term debt. 
As a result the short-term foreign debt exceeded the total foreign reserve 
increasing the possibility of a foreign exchange crisis. 
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   In the situation where the government did not regulate the entry of 
firms, the only possible mechanism that could prevent the excessive 
investment of firms were financial institutions and the capital market. 
However, these failed to fulfill their duty because of the moral hazard 
due to existing practices, the lack of transparency of the accounting 
structure, and the limitation of minority shareholders representation. As 
the government stopped intervention to the financial institutions in a 
period where they were in a traditional weak position with respect to 
the "chaebols", financial institutions were unable to restrain the excessive 
investment of the firms. Also even if the government had to strengthen 
the supervisory function of the financial institutions when the financial 
activities were liberalized, it did not strengthen at all the supervision of 
some financial institutions, especially the merchant banks, increasing the 
possibility of a financial crisis. Between 1992 and 1996, the ratio of 
short-term assets to short-term borrowing was 3~ 6% in the case of 
merchant banks, whereas it was higher than 80% in the case of 
commercial banks. This term-mismatch was one of the most important 
causes of the foreign exchange crisis.  
   In Mexico, prudence was not always the guiding criterion for Mexican 
banks in granting credit or for their clients in soliciting it. The nationalized 
banking system, which for years had directed financing mainly to the 
public sector, had organizational and information systems that could not 
adequately assess credit and market risks or monitor loan performance.10 
In addition, as the banks were reprivatized in 1991 and 1992, some new 
management teams, which were not in all cases experienced, took charge 
of the banks' lending function. 
   Reprivatization was accompanied by changes in the legal framework 
to introduce increasing competition in financial services from foreign 
institutions and to increase the efficiency of the financial institutions. The 
law, enacted in 1990, allowed conglomerate banking whereby a single 
                                                                 
10) Banco de México (1996) 
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holding company could provide various financial services. The problem 
was that regulatory and supervisory reform needed for conglomerate 
banking did not follow. For example, conglomerates as a group were not 
required to abide by prudential regulations, nor were they required to 
produce consolidated financial statements.  
   In both the Korean and Mexican cases, the speed of liberalization 
of the capital market surpassed the changes of the existing regulation, 
increasing the structural distortion and the possibility of facing a banking 
crisis or foreign exchange crisis. Although an implementation plan was 
under development, there was not enough time to translate those plans 
into an actual enhancement in capacity of the supervisory system. 
   However, the same absence or inadequacy of prudential regulation 
and supervision played a different role in the foreign exchange crisis and 
banking crisis in Korea and Mexico. In Korea, the lack of prudential 
regulation and supervision is considered to be one of the most important 
elements that contributed to the banking crisis and the subsequent currency 
crisis, whereas in Mexico, inadequate prudential regulation and supervi-
sion led to a weakness of the banking sector, and this exacerbated the 
effects of the foreign exchange crisis. The reason for this difference can 
be found in the way the capital market was opened. In Korea, financial 
institutions were the most active participants in the international capital 
transactions, whereas in Mexico, banks were restricted to borrow from 
abroad.  
 
 
   Conclusion 
 
The Mexican currency crises preceded the banking crisis, whereas, in 
Korea, the currency crisis was caused by the banking crisis. As both coun-
tries were in the process of financial and capital account liberalization, 
we can say that although currency crisis is closely related with capital 
account liberalization, the latter does not determine the causality between 
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banking crisis and currency crisis.  
   However, if we analyze the way the capital account was liberalized, 
we can find that there is close relationship between capital account 
liberalization and the order of banking and currency crisis. In Mexico, 
the capital account was liberalized largely by allowing foreign investment 
in the stock market and government bonds, while the borrowing of 
commercial banks was restricted. In Korea, the capital market was opened 
by allowing financial institution and firms to borrow from abroad and 
to issue bonds in the international capital market. The difference in the 
process by which capital account was liberalized partly explains why, 
in Mexico, the banking crisis deepened only after the currency crisis had 
broken out, and why, in Asian countries, the currency crisis was caused 
by the financial crisis.  
   In Korea, the lack of prudential regulation and supervision played an 
important role in the eruption of the banking crisis, which subsequently 
led to the currency crisis. In Mexico, inadequate prudential regulation 
and supervision strengthened the negative effects of the foreign exchange 
crisis on the banking sector. The policy implication is that the prudential 
regulation and supervision must be improved before the liberalization of 
the capital market even if the foreign borrowing of the banking sector 
remains strongly regulated. This is because the effects of the currency 
crisis would be instantaneously transmitted to the banking sector, and 
because the effects would be the stronger, the weaker is the prudential 
regulation and supervision.  
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